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Ethical vegetarians believe that it is morally wrong to eat meat. Yet, 
many self-ascribed “ethical vegetarians” continue to eat fish. The 
question I explore here is this: Can one coherently maintain that it 
is morally wrong to eat meat, but morally permissible to eat fish? I 
argue that it is morally inconsistent for ethical vegetarians to eat fish, 
not on the obvious yet superficial ground that fish flesh is meat, but 
on the morally substantive ground that fish are sentient intelligent 
beings capable of experiencing morally significant pain and thus de-
serve moral consideration equal to that owed birds and mammals.
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Answer me, machinist, has nature arranged all the 
means of feeling in this animal, so that it may not feel? 
has it nerves in order to be impassible? Do not suppose 
this impertinent contradiction in nature.   ~~Voltaire 
Ethical vegetarians abstain from eating meat on moral 
grounds. They believe that it is morally wrong to eat meat. Yet, 
many self-ascribed “ethical vegetarians” continue to eat fish. 
Indeed, many philosophers and ethicists who regard them-
selves as “ethical vegetarians” continue to eat fish. The ques-
tion I wish to explore here is this: Can one coherently maintain 
that it is morally wrong to eat meat, but morally permissible to 
eat fish? In what follows, I argue that it is morally inconsistent 
for ethical vegetarians to eat fish, not on the obvious yet super-
ficial ground that fish flesh is meat, but on the morally substan-
tive ground that fish deserve moral consideration equal to that 
owed birds and mammals. In particular, I argue that the very 
reasons that convince ethical vegetarians that it is wrong to eat 
birds and mammals also entail that it is wrong to eat fish.
My argument proceeds in three steps: In § I, I present a 
simple, straightforward argument for the immorality of eating 
meat, based on commonsense moral principles we all share. An 
argument like the one I present serves as the basis for most eth-
ical vegetarians’ belief that eating meat is wrong. In §§ II&III, 
I argue that the very same argument extends to fish. In short, I 
show that our shared moral principles entail that it is wrong to 
eat mammals, birds, and fish. Finally, in §IV, I consider a well-
intentioned attempt to justify eating fish and show why it fails.
Two caveats are in order. First, my principal reason for pre-
senting the § I argument for the immorality of eating meat is to 
highlight the sorts of reasons that convince ethical vegetarians 
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that eating meat is wrong. I only provide a cursory defense 
of that argument here, because I have already defended it at 
length elsewhere (Engel 2000, 2001, 2012, 2016a, and 2016b) 
and because my primary target—fish-eating ethical vegetar-
ians—already accept it. My aim is to show that anyone who 
accepts the § I argument for the immorality of eating meat is 
committed to the immorality of eating fish, on pain of incon-
sistency.
Second, ethical arguments are often context-dependent in 
that they presuppose a specific audience in a certain set of 
circumstances. Recognizing what that intended audience and 
context is, and what it is not, can prevent confusions about the 
scope of the ethical claim being made. My argument is context-
dependent in precisely this way. It is not aimed at those relative-
ly few indigenous peoples who, because of the paucity of edible 
vegetable matter available, must eat fish to survive. Rather, it is 
directed at people, like us, who live in agriculturally bountiful 
societies in which a wealth of healthful, nutritionally adequate, 
plant-based alternatives to fish are readily available. I intend 
to show that the very same widely-held moral principles that 
convince ethical vegetarians that eating meat is wrong (when 
plant-based foods are available) entail that eating fish is wrong 
(when plant-based foods are available).
I. The Moral Case for Vegetarianism
A. Common Ground
One of the simplest, most straightforward arguments for the 
immorality of eating meat is based on several widely-accepted 
commonsense moral principles, principles which you no doubt 
accept. These commonsense principles are so central to our 
conception of morality that any moral theory that conflicted 
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with them would be rejected as unsatisfactory on reflective 
equilibrium grounds. Since any adequate moral view must co-
here with these principles, we can appeal to these principles 
directly when making moral evaluations. The principles are 
these:
(P1) It is wrong to harm sentient1 animals for no good 
reason.
(P2) It is wrong to cause sentient animals to suffer for 
no good reason.
(P3) It is wrong to kill sentient animals for no good 
reason.2
As a convenient shorthand, I use the expression “HASK 
practice” to refer to any practice that involves HArming or in-
flicting Suffering on or Killing sentient animals for no good 
reason. Given this terminology, we can condense (P1) – (P3) 
into the following single principle: 
(P4) It is wrong to engage in HASK practices. 
And finally, just as it is wrong to pay a hitman to kill an an-
noying neighbor on one’s behalf,
(P5) It is wrong to pay others to engage in HASK prac-
tices on one’s behalf. 
These principles are not in dispute.3 Even the staunchest de-
fenders of animal use embrace these commonsense principles. 
For example, Carl Cohen (2001, 46) explicitly endorses (P2) 
and (P3): “If animals feel pain (and certainly mammals do, 
though we cannot be sure about insects and worms), we hu-
Mylan Engel Jr.
56
© Mylan Engel Jr., 2019
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
mans surely ought cause no pain to them that cannot be justi-
fied. Nor ought we kill them without reason.”4 Elsewhere (2001, 
226), Cohen reiterates his commitment to (P2) and (P3): “Our 
obligations to animals arise not from their rights, I believe, but 
from the fact that they can feel pain and from the fact that we, 
as moral agents, have a general obligation to avoid imposing 
needless pain or death.”5 Similarly, Peter Carruthers acknowl-
edges that sentient animals deserve direct moral consideration 
when he explicitly endorses (P2):
Most people hold that it is wrong to cause animals un-
necessary suffering. Opinions will differ as to what 
counts as necessary... But all will agree that gratuitous 
suffering—suffering caused for no good reason—is 
wrong. (Carruthers 1992, 8)
Thus, even these prominent animal use advocates are on 
record acknowledging that we owe sentient animals a non-
negligible amount of direct moral consideration. How much 
consideration? At least this much: We cannot harm animals or 
pay others to harm them, for no good reason. We cannot cause 
them to suffer or pay others to cause them to suffer, for no good 
reason. And we cannot kill them or pay others to kill them, for 
no good reason. If we engage in HASK practices or pay oth-
ers to engage in HASK practices on our behalf, we are doing 
something morally wrong. We are failing to accord the animals 
affected the moral consideration that they are due. 
It is important to be clear at the outset about what counts 
as a good reason, in the present context. A good reason must 
be a reason morally weighty enough to justify the behavior in 
question; it must be morally weighty enough to override the 
most significant interests of the animal in question. Suppose 
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I enjoy the smell of live kittens being burned to death. That is 
a reason to pour gasoline on a litter of living kittens, light it, 
and burn the kittens to death, but it is not a good reason. My 
relatively trivial interest in experiencing a particular olfactory 
sensation does not outweigh the kittens’ most significant inter-
ests in avoiding such suffering and premature death. Burning a 
kitten to death to enjoy the smell is a HASK practice, and it is 
clearly wrong for that very reason.
B. The Anti-HASK Argument for Ethical Vegetarianism 
Given principles (P1) – (P5), the case for ethical vegetarian-
ism is really quite simple. All one need do is show that meat-
producing animal agriculture is inherently a HASK practice. 
That demonstration can be accomplished in two steps. Step 
1: Show that meat-producing animal agriculture, by its very 
nature, inflicts harm, suffering, and death on the animals it 
converts to meat. Step 2: Show that there is no good reason to 
treat animals in these ways when equally nutritious plant-based 
food is readily available (which, in modern societies, it almost 
always is). Formally, the argument runs as follows:
1. All forms of meat-producing animal agriculture 
are inherently HASK practices.
2. It is wrong both to engage in, and to pay others to 
engage in, HASK practices (i.e., it is wrong both to 
engage in, and to pay others to engage in, practices 
that HArm, inflict Suffering on, or Kill sentient 
animals for no good reason). [(P1) – (P5)]  
3. When one purchases and consumes meat, one is 
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Therefore,
4. It is wrong to purchase and consume meat.6, 7
Premise 2 is just the conjunction of principles (P1) – (P5), 
commonsense moral principles we all accept. Premise 3 is also 
clearly true. When one purchases and consumes meat, one is 
paying the people who produce meat to engage in the HASK 
practices required to produce it. Since the anti-HASK argu-
ment is valid, the soundness of the argument rests on its major 
premise, premise 1. I now turn to a brief two-step defense of 
that premise. 
Step 1: The Ugly Reality
The process of converting living, breathing, conscious, 
sentient animals into meat is not a pretty one, and yet, that is 
precisely the process that all meat-producing farms—from the 
largest factory farms to the smallest family farms—are en-
gaged in. The process begins by forcibly impregnating female 
cows, pigs, chickens, turkeys, ducks, emus, and sheep—usu-
ally by artificial insemination, but sometimes by tethering and 
immobilizing the females in open-ended stalls or crates and 
introducing a “breeder” male who copulates with them repeat-
edly at will. After the birthing process, the mother is prompt-
ly separated from her young, which causes both her and her 
young a great deal of distress. After being removed from their 
mothers, the offspring are typically housed intensively in un-
natural, inhospitable warehouses or sheds for the duration of 
their lives. Those animals judged to be growing too slowly are 
inhumanely killed on site either by neck-wringing (in the case 
of chickens and turkeys) or by “thumping” (i.e., grabbing pig-
lets by their hind legs, slamming their heads on the concrete 
floor, and tossing them onto a discard pile). Thumping is not a 
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reliable method of killing piglets, and as a result, “thumped” 
piglets are often still alive when they are tossed onto the dis-
card pile, where they are left to die slow painful deaths. No 
attempt is made to stun these unwanted animals before they 
are killed. 
Since the animals cannot move about freely in these over-
crowded confinement facilities, they are forced to stand in their 
own feces and urine. The noxious ammonia fumes from the 
urine cause painful lung and eye irritation. In these cramped, 
unsanitary conditions, virtually all of the animals’ basic in-
stinctual urges (e.g., to nurse, stretch, move around, root, 
groom, build nests, rut, establish social orders, select mates, 
copulate, procreate, and rear offspring) are frustrated, causing 
boredom and stress in the animals. The inhumane, stressful 
conditions, in turn, increase aggression and cause other un-
natural behaviors including cannibalism. To prevent losses 
from cannibalism and aggression, the animals are subjected 
to preemptive mutilations. For example, to prevent chickens 
and turkeys from pecking each other to death, the birds are 
“debeaked” using a scalding hot blade that slices through the 
highly sensitive horn of the beak, leaving painful blisters in the 
mouth.8 Other routine mutilations include: dubbing (removal 
of the combs and wattles of male chickens and turkeys), toe 
clipping, tail docking, branding, dehorning, ear tagging, ear 
clipping, teeth pulling, and castration. In the interest of cost 
efficiency, all of these excruciating procedures are performed 
without anesthesia. Unanesthetized branding, dehorning, ear 
tagging, ear clipping, and castration are standard procedures 
on family farms, as well.9  
Lives filled with frustration and torment finally culmi-
nate, as the animals are inhumanely loaded onto trucks and 
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shipped long distances to slaughterhouses without food or wa-
ter and without adequate protection from the elements. Once 
at the slaughterhouse, the animals are hung upside down [Pigs, 
cattle, and sheep are suspended by one hind leg which often 
breaks.] and are brought via conveyor to the slaughterer who 
slits their throats. In many cases (and all kosher cases), the 
animals are fully conscious throughout the entire throat-slit-
ting ordeal. Undercover video footage documenting all of the 
above abuses can be found in the following short documen-
tary videos: “Glass Walls” (available at: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=sTifP6idBPs ); “From Farm to Fridge” (avail-
able at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fb2Z4RO5xCE ); 
and “What Cody Saw” (available at: http://www.whatcodysaw.
com ). 
The ugly reality is this: There is no practicable way to raise 
animals for human consumption without harming and killing 
those animals. Animal agriculture, by its very nature, involves 
harming animals, causing them to suffer, and killing them.10
Step 2: Why There Is No Good Reason to Kill and Eat 
Animals
I have documented the health benefits of plant-based diets 
elsewhere (Engel 2000 and 2016a), reporting the results of sev-
eral well-designed, carefully-controlled studies examining the 
relationship between diet and disease.11 I won’t reiterate the 
details of those studies here. Instead, I’ll simply report the po-
sitions of four highly-respected disseminators of nutritional in-
formation. The USDA’s Nutritional Guidelines for Americans 
states unequivocally: “Vegetarian diets are consistent with the 
Dietary Guidelines for Americans and can meet Recommended 
Dietary Allowances for nutrients” (USDA 1995, 6). The Physi-
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cians Committee for Responsible Medicine, a group of over 
3000 physicians committed to preventive medicine, recom-
mends centering our diets on the new four food groups--whole 
grains, vegetables, fruits, and legumes--and recommends com-
pletely eliminating meat and dairy products, the two principal 
sources of saturated fat and cholesterol in the American diet 
(Barnard 1993, 144-147). The Academy of Nutrition and Di-
etetics [AND]—the national professional organization for Reg-
istered Dietitians in the U.S.—is one of the most reputable nu-
tritional organizations in North America. The AND’s position 
statement on vegetarian diets leaves no doubt about the health 
benefits of plant-based diets:
It is the position of the Academy of Nutrition and Di-
etetics that appropriately planned vegetarian, includ-
ing vegan, diets are healthful, nutritionally adequate, 
and may provide health benefits for the prevention and 
treatment of certain diseases. These diets are appropri-
ate for all stages of the life cycle, including pregnancy, 
lactation, infancy, childhood, adolescence, older adult-
hood, and for athletes... Vegetarians and vegans are 
at reduced risk of certain health conditions, including 
ischemic heart disease, type 2 diabetes, hypertension, 
certain types of cancer, and obesity. Low intake of sat-
urated fat and high intakes of vegetables, fruits, whole 
grains, legumes, soy products, nuts, and seeds (all rich 
in fiber and phytochemicals) are characteristics of veg-
etarian and vegan diets that produce lower total and 
low-density lipoprotein cholesterol levels and better 
serum glucose control. These factors contribute to re-
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The USDA and U.S. Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices concur: 
In prospective studies of adults, compared to non-
vegetarian eating patterns, vegetarian-style eating pat-
terns have been associated with improved health out-
comes—lower levels of obesity, a reduced risk of car-
diovascular disease, and lower total mortality. Several 
clinical trials have documented that vegetarian eating 
patterns lower blood pressure. (2010, 45)
The evidence is unequivocal: Eating meat is not necessary 
for human survival or human flourishing. On the contrary, 
meat consumption promotes a number of chronic degenerative 
diseases and is detrimental to human health and well-being.13 
Consequently, all of the harm, suffering, and death inflicted on 
farmed animals is unnecessary. It serves no significant human 
interest. Since we can meet all of our nutritional needs with 
plant-based foods, there is no good reason to raise and kill ani-
mals for their flesh.14 
Taken together, steps 1 and 2 show that all forms of meat-
producing animal agriculture are HASK practices—they are 
practices that harm animals, cause them to suffer, and kill them 
for no good reason.15 Consequently, anyone who accepts (P1) 
– (P5) is committed to the immorality of eating meat, on pain 
of inconsistency. When I presented the anti-HASK argument 
elsewhere (Engel 2000, 2001, 2012, and 2016a), I did so in or-
der to show you that you are rationally committed to the im-
morality of eating meat, given your other beliefs. And while 
the argument still demonstrates your rational commitment to 
the immorality of eating meat (since, like the rest of us, you 
accept (P1) – (P5)), my primary reason for presenting the anti-
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HASK argument here is to establish the following important 
dialectical point: 
Self-ascribed ethical vegetarians accept the anti-
HASK argument presented here; they believe that eat-
ing meat is morally wrong because doing so supports 
practices that inflict harm, suffering, and death on 
farmed animals for no good reason.
II. Extending the Anti-HASK Argument to Fish
I shall now argue that anyone who accepts the anti-HASK 
argument for ethical vegetarianism is equally committed to the 
immorality of eating fish. The formal argument exactly paral-
lels the original anti-HASK argument:
1’.  All forms of fish production and harvesting are in-
herently HASK practices.
2.  It is wrong both to engage in, and to pay others 
to engage in, HASK practices (i.e., it is wrong both to 
engage in, and to pay others to engage in, practices that 
HArm, inflict Suffering on, or Kill sentient animals 
for no good reason). [(P1) – (P5)]
3’.  When one purchases and consumes fish, one is 
paying others to engage in HASK practices on one’s 
behalf.
Therefore,
4.  It is wrong to purchase and consume fish. 
Once again, the argument turns on its major premise, in this 
case premise 1’. As before, that premise can be defended in two 
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steps. Step 1’: Show that fish production and harvesting inher-
ently inflicts morally significant harm, suffering, and death on 
the animals it converts to meat. Step 2’: Show that there is no 
good reason to treat fish in these ways. I will begin with Step 2’.
Step 2’: Why There Is No Good Reason to Kill and Eat 
Fish
As noted above, the Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics’s 
position statement on vegetarian diets clearly notes that well-
planned vegan diets “are appropriate for all stages of the life 
cycle, including during pregnancy, lactation, infancy, child-
hood, and adolescence” and also notes that “vegans are at 
reduced risk of certain health conditions, including ischemic 
heart disease, type 2 diabetes, hypertension, certain types of 
cancer, and obesity” (Melina, Craig, and Levin 2016, 1970). In 
short, well-planned vegan diets, totally devoid of all fish and 
seafood, are heart-healthy, cancer-protective diets that meet all 
of our nutritional needs. As such, there simply isn’t any dietary 
need to eat fish.
But don’t we need to eat fish rich in omega-3 fatty acids for 
their heart protective benefits?16 Not according to Dr. William 
Castelli, Director of the Framingham Heart Study from 1965-
1995. He maintains: “The vegetarian societies of the world 
have the best diet. Within our own country, they outlive the rest 
of us by at least seven years, and have only 10 or 15 percent of 
our heart attack rate” (Stapley 1996, 15). Based on his research, 
Castelli maintains that the most heart healthy diet is a vegan 
diet. (Stapley 1996, 15)
Myths die hard. So, a bit more about omega-3s. Alpha-lino-
lenic acid (ALA), a short-chain n-3 polyunsaturated fatty acid, 
is the only essential omega-3 fatty acid. ALA is found primar-
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ily in plant-based foods, including dark green leafy vegetables, 
beans, nuts, seeds, and fruits. Walnuts, wheat germ and ground 
flaxseed are especially good sources. The long-chain omega-3 
fatty acids [eicosapentaenoic acid (EPA) and docosahexaenoic 
acid (DHA)] found in fish are not considered essential nutrients 
because they can be synthesized from ALA (Drake and Hig-
don, 2012). Simply put, fish consumption is not necessary to 
ensure adequate intake of omega-3 fatty acids. 
Not only that, there are a number of reasons to think that 
plant-based sources of omega-3s are preferable to fish-based 
sources. First, both fish and shellfish are high in cholesterol. 
For example, a three-ounce serving of bass contains 80 mg of 
cholesterol, the same amount of cholesterol as a three-ounce 
steak, and the 166 mg of cholesterol in three ounces of shrimp 
is more than double that found in the steak (PCRM 2009, 2). 
No plant-based sources of omega-3s contain any cholesterol 
whatsoever. Second, much of the fat in fish is saturated fat, the 
kind of fat known to clog our arteries. For example, Chinook 
salmon derives 52% of its calories from fat, roughly 25% of 
which is saturated fat (PCRM 2009, 2). Finally, fish consump-
tion is one of the leading sources of heavy metals and other tox-
ins in our diet. Traces of mercury are found in nearly all fish. 
The Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine [PCRM] 
notes that mercury consumption “has been associated with in-
creased blood pressure, irregular and increased heart rate, and 
increased rates of death from cardiovascular disease in at least 
12 scientific studies” (2009, 1). The PCRM also notes that sev-
eral other pollutants bioaccumulate in fish and shellfish, includ-
ing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), dioxin, chlordane, DDT, 
and organochlorine pesticides (2009, 1) and highlights some of 
the known health risks of these highly toxic substances:
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• According to the EPA, PCBs are known carcino-
gens in some species and probable carcinogens in 
humans. PCBs also have been shown to disrupt 
immune function, cause learning disabilities, and 
disrupt neurological development; they may have 
endocrine effects as well.
• Dioxins, too, are known carcinogens and have also 
been shown to cause liver damage, weight loss, 
skin rashes, and reductions in immune function. 
They are especially dangerous during fetal devel-
opment and early childhood.
• Chlordane and DDT, an organochlorine, are pesti-
cides that have been banned from use in the United 
States. Nonetheless, appreciable levels of these 
highly toxic chemicals remain in waterways and 
bioaccumulate in fish. (PCRM 2009, 1)
After carefully weighing the benefits and risks of eating 
fish, the PCRM concludes: 
Given the clear evidence that fish are commonly con-
taminated with toxins that have well-known and irre-
versible damaging effects on children and adults, the 
consumption of fish should not be encouraged. . . . It 
is best to avoid the consumption of fish and shellfish. 
Other, more healthful foods from plant sources offer 
the full range of essential nutrients without the toxins 
and other health risks in fish. (2009, 2)
The four-year (2002-2006) Adventist Health Study-2 [AHS-
2], involving over 60,000 men and women, is the only compre-
hensive longitudinal study to systematically compare the health 
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benefits of vegan diets with those of pescetarian diets. AHS-2 
found that vegans had a 50% reduced risk of developing type 2 
diabetes (compared to non-vegetarians), whereas pescetarians 
(fish-eating vegetarians) only had a 30% reduced risk of de-
veloping type 2 diabetes (compared to non-vegetarians). Only 
2.9% of vegans developed diabetes, while 4.8% of pescetar-
ians developed diabetes. (Tonstad, Butler, et al., 2009, 791) The 
study also found that vegans were leaner and had lower Body 
Mass Indices [BMIs] than pescetarians. The normal range for 
BMIs is 18.5-25.0. Those with BMIs of 25.1-30.0 are consid-
ered overweight. Those with BMIs over 30 are considered 
obese. The mean BMI for vegans in the study was 23.6 (normal 
weight), while the mean BMI for pescetarians was 26.3 (over-
weight). (Tonstad, Butler, et al. 2009, 791) In addition, the study 
found that, compared with non-vegetarians, vegans were 75% 
less likely to be treated for hypertension, whereas pescetar-
ians were only 38% less likely to be treated for hypertension. 
(Marsh, Zeuschner, et al., 2012) Vegan diets were also found to 
confer a significantly lower risk for overall cancer incidence in 
both genders and for female-specific cancers than other dietary 
patterns. (Tantamango-Bartley, Jaceldo-Siegl, et al., 2012, 286)
In sum, there are compelling reasons to think that 100% 
plant-based vegan diets are nutritionally superior to fish- and 
seafood-supplemented plant-based diets. That is the conclu-
sion that Dr. Castelli has arrived at after directing the Fram-
ingham Heart Study for thirty years. It is also the conclusion 
that the PCRM has arrived at. And it’s the conclusion strongly 
supported by the findings of the Adventist Health Study-2. But 
that conclusion is a stronger conclusion than Step 2’ requires. 
All that is required to successfully complete Step 2’ is show-
ing that fish consumption is nutritionally unnecessary, and 
to show that, all one needs to show is that vegan diets are as 
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nutritionally adequate, heart-healthy, and cancer-protective as 
fish-supplemented plant-based diets, about which there is no 
dispute. The Academy of Nutrition and Dietetics, the Dieti-
tians of Canada [See note 12.], the Physicians Committee for 
Responsible Medicine, Dr. Castelli of the Framingham Heart 
Study, the USDA, and the U.S. Department of Health and Hu-
man Services, all agree that well-planned vegan diets are as 
nutritionally adequate, heart-healthy, and cancer-protective, as 
nonvegetarian diets, including pescetarian diets. The evidence 
is unequivocal: Fish consumption is not an essential part of an 
optimal diet. There is no nutritional need to eat fish. Since we 
can easily meet all of our nutritional needs with a plant-based 
diet totally devoid of fish, nutrition does not give us a good 
reason to eat fish.
What about taste? Enjoying the taste of fish is a reason to 
catch and kill a fish, but it is not a good reason. Just as my 
trivial interest in experiencing a particular olfactory sensa-
tion (the aroma of live kittens burning to death) does not out-
weigh the kittens’ most significant interests in avoiding such 
suffering and premature death, my equally trivial interest in 
experiencing a particular gustatory sensation (the taste of fried 
trout) does not outweigh the trout’s most significant interests in 
avoiding a painful premature death and, thus, does not justify 
catching and killing the trout. There is no good reason to eat 
fish. 
Step 1’: But can fish feel? 
If fish aren’t conscious sentient beings, then they can’t feel 
pain, they can’t suffer, they can’t be harmed in morally sig-
nificant ways, and their deaths are no more morally significant 
than the deaths of plants. So, to show that fish production and 
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harvesting inflicts morally significant harm, suffering, and 
death on the animals it converts to meat, the first thing that one 
must do is show that fish are conscious sentient beings. That is 
the burden of § III. The second thing one must do is show that 
the process of fish production and harvesting, by its very na-
ture, inflicts harm, suffering, and death on the fish it converts 
to meat. That is the task of § IV. 
III. The Cumulative Case for Fish Sentience, 
Consciousness, and Intelligence17
A. Anatomical and Neurophysiological Evidence of Pain 
Perception in Fish
To determine whether fish possess the basic “hardware” 
needed to experience pain, Victoria Braithwaite and Mike Gen-
tle looked at cross-sections of all three branches (i.e., the man-
dibular, maxillary, and ophthalmic branches) of the trigeminal 
facial nerve of trout18 and found both myelinated A-delta fibres 
(responsible for acute protective pain in humans) and unmy-
elinated C fibres (responsible for restorative pain in humans), 
though trout have a significantly higher percentage of A-delta 
fibres than humans. (Braithwaite 2010, 52-55) Braithwaite and 
Gentle also identified 58 different receptors scattered over the 
face and snout of trout and demonstrated that 22 of these re-
ceptors were nociceptors. (Braithwaite 2010, 56-58) To isolate 
the receptors, Braithwaite and Gentle deeply anesthetized the 
trout involved in the experiment. Although the fish were un-
conscious, their nervous system was still functioning. Braith-
waite and Gentle then carefully removed the skin and bone of 
the brain case from the head of the trout. The cerebellum and 
olfactory and optic lobes of the brain were removed to expose 
the trigeminal ganglion. They then applied a glass probe to 
various parts of the fish’s face. When the probe touched a re-
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ceptor, an electrical signal was detected in the ganglion. After 
detecting 58 receptors in this fashion, they tested the receptors 
with three kinds of noxious stimuli (touch, heat, and chemical) 
to see whether they were nociceptors. To measure sensitivity 
to touch, they applied von Frey filaments, fine hair-like metal 
strands with a controlled amount of force. They measured sen-
sitivity to temperature by shining a narrowly focused quartz 
light that could be heated to specific temperatures. They inves-
tigated the receptors’ sensitivity to a noxious chemical by ap-
plying drops of vinegar to the receptors. To ensure that the re-
ceptors weren’t triggered by the mechanical action of dropping 
the vinegar on the receptors, they dropped similar sized drops 
of water on the receptors, as a control. In this manner, they 
identified 22 nociceptors, some of which responded to all three 
forms of noxious stimuli, others of which were more special-
ized, only responding to two of the forms of noxious stimuli. 
(Braithwaite 2010, 56-58)
Braithwaite’s and Gentle’s research clearly demonstrates 
that fish have the nociceptors and afferent nerves required for 
pain perception. To determine whether the pain signals from 
these nociceptors actually make their way to the fishes’ brains, 
Rebecca Dunlap and Peter Laming conducted experiments in 
which they removed a small portion of the skulls of goldfish 
and trout so that recording electrodes could be implanted in 
different regions of these fishes’ brains. They then applied a re-
petitive pin-prod stimulus to the skin just behind the gill cover 
to measure nociceptive responses. Recordings were taken from 
the spinal cord, cerebellum, tectum, and telencephalon (or fore-
brain). They describe their findings as follows: 
Neuronal responses were elicited in all these regions 
of the central nervous system in both species of fish 
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during brush (mechanoceptive) and pin-prod (noci-
ceptive) stimuli... Mechanoreceptive and nociceptive 
neuronal responses to various stimuli were elicited in 
all regions, and responses were detected as far as the 
telencephalon in both species... The accurate setting of 
timed prods allowed the latency of the response to be 
calculated in all regions. From these data, conduction 
velocities suggested that A delta and C fibers were ac-
tivated;... This study has shown that there is neuronal 
activity in all brain areas including the telencephalon, 
suggesting a nociceptive pathway from the periphery 
to the higher central nervous system of fish. (Dunlap 
and Laming 2005, 561)
In mammals, the amygdala and hippocampus are critical 
areas of the limbic system. The former is linked with emo-
tional states like fear; the latter is associated with learning 
and memory, determining the timing and sequence of events, 
and spatial learning. (Braithwaite 2010, 99) In fish brains, the 
amygdala and hippocampus are located in the telencephalon. 
When Cosme Salas and Fernando Rodruíguez, researchers 
at the University of Seville, surgically lesioned different por-
tions of fish forebrains, they found that damage to the amyg-
dala region of fish forebrains made it difficult for the fish to 
learn how to avoid something painful like an electric shock, 
while lesions to the hippocampus rendered the fish incapable 
of swimming through a maze that they could easily navigate 
before the surgery. According to Braithwaite, “The effects of 
the lesions were extremely specific; fish without a functioning 
hippocampus could still learn to avoid shocks, and fish with the 
amygdala lesioned could still solve maze tasks. So, the lesion-
ing didn’t impair learning by itself, but rather a specific form of 
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learning” (2010, 101). On the basis of this research, Braithwaite 
concludes:
So developmentally and functionally there is evidence 
of a limbic-like area in the fish forebrain. Allied with 
this area there is also evidence of dopaminergic con-
nections within the fish forebrain. Dopaminergic 
systems play a crucial role in reward learning and in 
mammals they are associated with positive and nega-
tive states of mind that form the basis of emotions. 
(2010, 101)
These studies show that fish possess both the anatomy and 
the neurophysiology needed to perceive pain. In addition to 
this physiological evidence, there is ample behavioral evidence 
that fish feel pain.
B. Behavioral Evidence of Pain Perception in Fish
We know that, in humans, painful noxious stimuli inhibit 
hunger and cause increased respiration and heart rates. To de-
termine whether noxious stimuli affect fish in the same way, 
Braithwaite and Gentle injected two groups of trout with a nox-
ious stimulus. Trout in the first group had bee venom injected 
in the skin just under their mouths. Trout in the second group 
were injected with vinegar in the same place. There were also 
two control groups. Trout in the first control group were simply 
handled (which itself is stressful for fish); trout in the second 
control group were injected with a mild saline solution in the 
skin just under their mouths. All four groups of fish showed 
increased gill beat rates. The two control groups had an in-
creased gill beat rate of 70 (compared to a normal gill beat rate 
of 50), but the fish that received the noxious stimuli were much 
more distressed and had gill beat rates of 90. Some of the trout 
Mylan Engel Jr.
73
© Mylan Engel Jr., 2019
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
injected with vinegar rubbed their snouts on the aquarium’s 
glass walls or rocky bottom. Within 80 minutes, the gill beat 
rate of the trout in the two control groups returned to normal, 
and they began showing interest in food. The gill beat rate of 
the trout in the two noxious stimuli groups remained elevated 
above 70 beats per minute for 3.5 hours, after which it returned 
to normal and the fish in these two groups started to show in-
terest in food again. (Braithwaite 2010, 58-64)
Braithwaite and Gentle have identified the following addi-
tional behavioral evidence of pain perception in trout. Trout 
are wary of new objects (neophobic) and show strong avoid-
ance behavior when a new object is introduced into their tanks. 
When given a benign saline injection in their mouths, trout 
continued to manifest strong new-object-avoidance behavior. 
However, trout injected with vinegar stayed close to the newly 
introduced block tower, which suggested to Braithwaite that 
the fish were distracted by the pain from the vinegar injection. 
(Braithwaite 2010, 67-68) To test her pain-distraction hypoth-
esis, Braithwaite repeated the entire experiment as before, only 
in addition to the vinegar and saline injections, all of the fish 
received small doses of morphine. As predicted, the vinegar-
treated fish that had received morphine showed normal new-
object-avoidance behavior. (Braithwaite 2010, 69)
Russian researchers Lilia Chervova and Dmitii Lapshin 
have found that nociceptors are widely distributed across the 
entire body surface (including fins) of trout, cod, carp, and 
sturgeon. (2004, 1420) To test the effects of analgesics on these 
four types of fish, Chervova and Lapshin semirigidly fixed the 
fish in a flow chamber and implanted a shock-administering 
electrode in the caudal fin blade (in a manner that excluded 
direct stimulation of muscle fibers). When painful bursts of 
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electric current were administered to these fishes’ caudal fins, 
the fish responded with a violent jerk of their tails. Chervova 
and Lapshin then administered various opioid and nonopioid 
analgesics to the fish to determine whether these substances 
would reduce the nociceptive response in the fish (based on 
measuring the degree of tail flicking). Among their findings:
• In cod: sydnophenum injected peritoneally de-
creased pain sensitivity by 15-89%; local subcu-
taneous injections of 2% solution of novocainum 
blocked the nociceptive reactions, and intranasal 
administration of 2.5-12.5 mg/kg of beta-casomor-
phine decreased pain sensitivity by 15-37% (de-
pending on dose). (Chervova and Lapshin 2004, 
1422)
• In rainbow trout: intranasal administration of 0.20-
0.75 mg/kg of the mu opioid agent dermorphine 
caused a dose-dependent decrease in the pain sen-
sitivity by 12-55%. The analgesic effect was usu-
ally observed within ten minutes after administra-
tion and lasted for at least one hour. (Chervova and 
Lapshin 2004, 1422)
• In carp: nociceptive thresholds significantly in-
creased following the intramuscular injection of 
agonists of mu, delta, and kappa opioid recep-
tors—tramadol 10-100 nmol/g, DADLE 10-50 
nmol/g, and U-50488 30-80 nmol/g, respectively. 
Five to fifteen minutes after the administration 
of tramadol, changes in fish sensitivity to painful 
stimuli were observed. The analgetic effect was 
dose-dependent; the higher the dose, the more 
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quickly it acted. The lack of responses to increas-
ing pain could not be blamed on tramadol immobi-
lizing the fish, because the same fish placed into an 
aquarium showed normal swimming and behavior. 
Tramadol had no analgetic effect if naloxone, an 
antagonist of opioid receptors, was administered 
before. (Chervova and Lapshin 2004, 1422) 
• Sturgeon were found to experience nociception 
as well as bony fishes. They reacted to the painful 
electrical stimuli with the same behavior – a jerk 
of the tail. Their nociceptive thresholds were com-
parable to that of carp. Their pattern of response 
after administration of a 100 nmol/g tramadol so-
lution was the same as that of carp. (Chervova and 
Lapshin 2004, 1423)
Chervova and Lapshin’s research shows that trout, cod, 
carp, and sturgeon have both opioid and nonopioid antinoci-
ceptive systems—endogenous pain control mechanisms—that 
work similar to the ones found in humans. As Chervova and 
Lapshin put it: 
Our results indicate that, like higher vertebrates, fish 
also develop a prolonged analgesia in response to ago-
nists of the opioid mu receptors. Hence, fish have an 
antinociceptive system consisting of the opioid recep-
tors similar to those in terrestrial vertebrates. . . . The 
decrease in pain sensitivity under the action of nonopi-
oid preparations analginum and sidnophenum as well 
as analgesy caused by stress, illustrates the presence in 
fishes of other endogenous analgesic systems in addi-
tion to the opioid system. (2004, 1424)
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Here we can appropriately echo Voltaire: Has nature outfit-
ted organisms incapable of experiencing pain with endogenous 
pain-control mechanisms? “Don’t suppose this impertinent 
contradiction in nature” (Voltaire 1989, 21).
The cumulative anatomical, neurophysiological, and behav-
ioral evidence for pain perception in fish leaves little doubt that 
fish are conscious sentient beings that can and do feel pain in 
response to a noxious stimulus or injury. Not only are they sen-
tient, it also turns out, as we shall now see, that fish are far 
more intelligent than typically thought.
C. Reasoning Fish and Fish Cognition
1. Spatial Learning and Long-Term Memory
Frillfin gobies live in coastal areas. When the waters recede 
at low tide, these fish become “trapped” in discontiguous rock 
pools. When frillfin gobies are threatened by a hungry sea bird 
(or a crazed scientist prodding them with a stick), they will 
jump with remarkable accuracy to an adjacent pool (which, of 
course, they cannot see from the vantage point of their current 
rock pool). If the threat persists, they will jump from pool to 
pool until they reach open water. When Lester Aronson first 
observed this behavior in 1949, he theorized that: “these gobies 
swim over the tide pools at high tide and acquire an effective 
memory of the general features of the topography of a limited 
area around the home pool which they are able to utilize when 
locked in their pools at low tide” (1951, 22). To test his hypoth-
esis, he transferred gobies to unfamiliar pools and threatened 
them with a stick. The transplanted gobies “never jumped even 
when prodded until they were so exhausted that they could be 
easily picked out of the water by hand” (Aronson 1951, 18). 
They didn’t jump because they didn’t know where to jump. 
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In a separate experiment, Aronson used a simulated tidal 
situation to determine how long it takes frillfin gobies to map 
the topography of a new environment. He found that these fish 
need as little as one experience at high tide to generate an ac-
curate 3-D map of the local topography that provides them with 
the ability to plan safe escape routes. (Braithwaite 2010, 88-9) 
Other studies have shown that frillfin gobies are able to “return 
to their home pool even after being displaced by 30 m” (Brown 
2015, 9) and that “even after being removed from their home 
pools for 40 days, the fish could still remember the location of 
the surrounding pools” (Brown 2015, 9).
2. Memory, Fish Recognition, and Transitive Inference
Logan Grosenick, Tricia Clement, and Russell Fernald have 
demonstrated that Siamese fighting fish (Astatotilapia burtoni) 
are able to recognize the winners and losers of fights they have 
witnessed and that they make transitive inferences when infer-
ring dominance hierarchies among rival male fighting fish. For 
eleven days, they had eight bystander males (located in central-
ly placed aquaria) observe other male fighting fish fight each 
other in peripherally located aquaria. Each bystander fish saw 
staged fights between five size-matched males (A to E, where 
each letter stands for a different rival male). The fights were 
rigged so that every day the bystander males observed A beat 
B, B beat C, C beat D, and D beat E.19 Grosenick then the put 
the bystander males in the middle of A and E (in effect forcing 
the bystanders to fight). The bystanders immediately swam to-
ward E. That result could be explained as follows. In the rigged 
fights, A never lost and E never won. So, it is possible that 
the bystanders were just swimming toward the fish they tagged 
“loser”. Perhaps, but that simple hypothesis can’t explain their 
next result. When placed between B and D, the bystanders im-
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mediately engaged D, suggesting that they judged D to be the 
weaker fish. Since the bystanders had seen each of these two 
fish (i.e., B and D) win one fight and lose one fight (each day), 
they couldn’t simply be tagging one of them “loser”. The most 
plausible explanation for why these bystander males consis-
tently judged D to be weaker than B is that they reasoned tran-
sitively from D is weaker than C and C is weaker than B to D is 
weaker than B. (Grosenick, Clement, et al. 2007) Grosenick’s 
experiment provides compelling evidence that Siamese fight-
ing fish have extended memory, reliable fish recognition capa-
bility, and the ability to make transitive inferences.
3. Temporal Awareness
Can fish tell time? Apparently. Culum Brown explains one 
way of measuring time-place learning in fish:
A typical approach is to feed the fish at one end of an 
aquarium in the evening and the other end in the morn-
ing. Each day the location of the fish is recorded just 
prior to feeding. If the fish show anticipatory behav-
ior by congregating at the feeding end, then they have 
learnt the task. Poeciliids and galaxiids can learn this 
task in around two weeks... By comparison, rats take 
about 19 days to learn this task. (2015, 8)
Phil Gee, a psychologist at the University of Plymouth in 
England, and his colleagues carried out an experiment that 
demonstrated operant temporal discrimination learning in 
goldfish. In stage 1, the goldfish (housed in separate aquaria) 
were taught to press a lever to release food, and the behavior 
was reinforced (i.e., food was released) every time the lever 
was pressed. In stage 2, the feeding time was gradually re-
stricted to one hour per day [2:00 PM to 3:00 PM for some of 
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the goldfish; and 2:00 AM to 3:00 AM for other goldfish]. Dur-
ing stage 1, the goldfish pressed the lever in their respective 
tanks at a fairly consistent rate of 3-5 presses per 15-minute in-
terval throughout each 24-hour period. However, by the end of 
stage 2 when a stable pattern of responding had been reached, 
Gee and his colleagues report: 
a typical daily record showed a level of responding [le-
ver-pressing] that was close to zero until between 4 and 
6 hr before food became available. Once responding 
[lever-pressing] had begun, the rate accelerated almost 
linearly with time until it reached a level of approxi-
mately 40 responses per 15 min immediately prior to 
feeding. During the hour of food availability, the rate 
of response dropped to around 10 presses per minute 
[presumably because the goldfish were spending time 
eating], and then dropped back to zero within an hour 
of the end of the feeding period. (Gee, Stephenson, and 
Wright 1994, 5-6).
Without some ability to process time, it’s unclear how the 
fish could have managed to reliably anticipate when to press the 
levers at the appropriate times.
4. Social Intelligence, Cooperation, and Reconciliation
Fish are capable of entering into complex cooperative rela-
tionships with fish of other species. One such example is that 
of cleaner wrasses and their “clients.” Brown describes their 
cooperative relationship as follows:
Cleaner wrasse occupy cleaning stations on coral out-
crops and remove parasites and dead skin from the sur-
face of client fish. They have a large number of regular 
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customers, and they recognise them all individually. 
The clients present themselves and perform a “clean 
me” stance which signals to the cleaner that they re-
quire a good service. Of course there are many stations 
a client can potentially visit so it is very important that 
the cleaner does a good job to keep up its reputation. 
If the cleaner should accidentally bite the client, then 
the client will rapidly swim away. But the cleaner has a 
mode of reconciliation; they chase after the distraught 
client and give them a back rub, thus enticing them to 
come again. (2015, 11)
In this win-win cooperative arrangement, the wrasses get a 
meal, and the clients get exfoliated.
Another example is that of the cooperative hunting relation-
ship that exists between groupers and moray eels. When a grou-
per chases a prey fish into a coral reef crevice, the grouper can 
wait and hope that the fish comes out, but has no guarantee that 
the fish will come out the same way. What’s a hungry grouper 
to do? Not wanting to wait, the grouper seeks out a moray eel 
for assistance. After finding an eel, the grouper signals the eel 
by vigorous headshaking and making a series of vertical move-
ments. At this point, the eel can ignore the signal, but often the 
two fish swim off together with the grouper leading the way. 
The grouper takes the eel to the part of the coral reef where the 
prey fish was last seen, sometimes even “pointing” by standing 
on its head and putting its snout in the hole where it wants the 
eel to go in. Roughly half the time the eel gets the prey fish. 
The other half of the time, the fish emerges and the grouper 
quickly snatches its meal. Such cooperative hunting requires 
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Interim Conclusion
When it comes to birds and mammals, there is growing con-
sensus that, because birds and mammals are conscious sentient 
intelligent beings, they deserve direct moral consideration. The 
research highlighted in the present section makes it equally 
clear that fish are conscious, sentient, cognitively sophisticated, 
intelligent beings, who, like birds and mammals, deserve direct 
moral consideration. As such, it is wrong to harm them, cause 
them to suffer, or kill them without good reason.
IV. Fishy Reasoning
I now turn from reasoning fish to the fishy reasoning some 
people use to justify killing and eating fish.
A. The StarKist Tuna Defense
Years ago, the StarKist Company ran a series of cartoon 
commercials featuring Charlie the Tuna. The commercials de-
picted Charlie as a Beatnik who wore a beret and coke bottle 
glasses and who had impeccably good taste (He played the 
harp, created paintings, hobnobbed with celebrity sharks, etc.). 
For some reason, Charlie wanted to be caught and killed by 
StarKist so that his flesh could be stuffed into cans for hu-
mans to eat. In an ironic twist, Charlie wasn’t good enough 
for StarKist. The commercials would end with a despondent 
Charlie as he read the lowered sign “Sorry Charlie” and heard 
the voiceover “StarKist doesn’t want tunas with good taste, it 
wants tunas that taste good.” What the commercials somehow 
managed to convey is that StarKist would have been doing 
Charlie a favor by killing him and packing him in a can.
Mylan Engel Jr.
82
© Mylan Engel Jr., 2019
http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/ Vol. 23, Issue 1
Some well-intentioned people attempt to justify the killing 
and eating of fish on similar grounds. They reason as follows: 
“Fish experience quicker, less painful deaths at our hands than 
they would otherwise experience in the wild. So, we’re actu-
ally doing them a favor by killing and eating them!” I call this 
the “StarKist Tuna Defense.” One famous proponent of this de-
fense is Jeremy Bentham, who argued as follows:
If the being eaten were all, there is very good reason 
why we should be suffered to eat such of them as we 
like to eat: we are the better for it, and they are never 
the worse…. The death they suffer in our hands com-
monly is, and always may be, a speedier, and by that 
means a less painful one, than that which would await 
them in the inevitable course of nature. (Bentham 
1988, 311 [Sec. XVII, n. 1])
B. How We Catch and Kill Fish
The biggest and most devastating problem with the StarKist 
Tuna Defense is this: There’s no good reason to think that fish 
die quicker, less painful, less traumatic deaths at our hands 
than they would typically die in the wild. Consider some of the 
ways we catch and kill fish.
1. Long-Line Fishing
Long-line fishing is used to catch tuna, swordfish, and ma-
hi-mahi. Hundreds of lengths of fishing line ten meters long 
rigged with floats and hundreds of baited hooks are left for sev-
eral hours at a specific depth. When fish take the bait, barbed 
hooks get imbedded in the highly sensitive nociceptor-lined 
tissue of their throats and mouths. Braithwaite describes the 
fate of hooked fish as follows: “Once hooked, depending on 
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the number of lines set, the fish may have up to 10 hours to 
wait before the lines are collected. Many fish are exhausted 
from trying to escape, but they are still alive as they are hauled 
onto the deck of the fishing vessel and then left to suffocate in 
the air” (2010, 175). Hardly a quick painless death. The baited 
long lines are indiscriminate about what they catch and often 
end up catching non-target species, which the industry euphe-
mistically refers to as “by-catch” – the fishing industry’s own 
form of collateral damage. Braithwaite highlights a common 
example: “the squid-baited hooks also attract sea birds such 
as albatross who themselves then become caught on the hooks 
and drown. Hundreds of thousands of birds have died this way 
and four species of albatross are perilously close to extinction” 
(2010, 175).
2. Deep Long-Line Fishing
Deep-water long-line fishing uses a similar technique, only 
the lines are weighted to operate at the sea floor—sometimes 
hundreds of meters deep—and have many more hooks at-
tached. As with shallow long-line fishing, hooked fish often 
must wait hours before being hauled to the surface to suffo-
cate on the decks of the fishing vessels. In addition, turtles, 
dolphins, and whales get caught on the lines and drown. More 
by-catch. (Braithwaite 2010, 176)
3. Trawling
Large nets with a wide opening that funnels down to a 
closed end section are hauled through the water at different 
depths indiscriminately catching everything in their path. The 
fish swim to the point of exhaustion trying to out swim the 
nets. When the nets are finally hauled in and pulled out of the 
water, those fish at the bottom of the net are crushed to death 
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by the weight of the fish above them. The rest of the fish are 
dumped on the deck of the vessel where they frantically flap 
about until they suffocate. When deep-water trawling nets are 
used, the fish also experience barometric trauma from the rap-
id decrease in pressure. Fish have swim bladders that allow 
them to maintain and control buoyancy. The rapid change in 
barometric pressure damages their swim bladders. Braithwaite 
describes the results: “Without time to adjust to the decreasing 
pressure, the gas-filled swim bladder typically becomes over-
inflated, causing huge distention inside the fish. Sometimes the 
pressure is so great that their stomach and intestines are pushed 
out of their mouth and anus. Eyes can also become distorted 
and bulge out” (Braithwaite, 2010, 177).
As with long-line fishing, non-targeted fish get caught in the 
trawling nets along with the desired fish. According to Jeffrey 
Masson, this unintended by-catch is: 
calculated to be one quarter of the global fish catch. 
Included are thousands of crabs, starfish, juvenile cod, 
sharks, and hundreds of other “unwanted” sea crea-
tures, as well as many rare species. They are dumped 
back into the ocean, dead. The long lines also take and 
kill marine mammals, birds, and sea turtles. Purse 
seine nets catch dolphin, who die horribly of asphyxi-
ation. . . . For every 3 tons of fish processed, 1 ton or 
more of other sea animals are killed. (Masson 2009, 
114-5).  
4. Aquaculture
Nearly half of all the fish consumed today are raised in land-
based or net-enclosed ocean-based aquafarms, where the fish 
spend their entire lives in cramped, filthy enclosures and where 
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many suffer from parasitic infections, diseases, and debilitat-
ing injuries. Drugs and genetic engineering are used to accel-
erate growth. Smaller fish, prevented from swimming away by 
the enclosure nets, are bullied and often killed by larger fish. 
To reduce such killing, the fish are sorted by being force to 
swim through a series of grates. The smaller fish slip through 
the smaller grates. This “grading” process is itself very stress-
ful on the fish and causes them to get scraped and lose scales. 
Conditions are so abysmal that anywhere from 25-50 percent of 
the fish die before the aqua-farmer is ready to slaughter them.20 
There are no regulations that require the humane treatment 
of fish, and as a result, slaughter techniques vary. Common 
slaughter techniques include:
a. Head Bashing
Large fish, like Salmon, are sometimes bashed on the head 
with specialized bats called “priests.” Since head-bashing isn’t 
an exact science, many of the fish are seriously injured but not 
killed by the blow, and as a result, remain fully conscious, as 
their gills are slit with knives so that they can bleed out.
b. Suffocation
In the case of smaller fish, like trout, the ponds are often 
simply drained. The fish are then either left to suffocate or they 
are packed in ice while they are still conscious (ice-packing 
slows their metabolism and actually prolongs the time it takes 
for them to die).
c. Carbon Dioxide Poisoning
Yet another method of killing farmed fish involves transfer-
ring the fish from their enclosures to tanks filled with CO2-
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saturated water. After being rendered motionless by the CO2 
gas, the fish are removed from the tank, their gills are slit with 
a knife, and they are left to bleed out before they are taken to 
the processing tables. Once thought to be a humane method of 
fish slaughter, Braithwaite tells a different story: 
As the fish enter the CO2-saturated water, their envi-
ronment suddenly becomes very acidic, which irritates 
softer tissues such as the gills. The stress of the rapid 
change in environment often causes the fish to become 
very agitated and to excrete ammonia, further affect-
ing the quality of the water within the tank. The fish 
struggle for several minutes before they become im-
mobile from exhaustion and lack of oxygen. There is 
actually no evidence that the fish are anaesthetized at 
this stage—so they are not unconscious when their 
gills are cut. The ice they are then packed into chills 
them, but because these animals are cold blooded, 
their metabolism simply slows, thus prolonging the 
time it takes them to die. (2010, 181)
d. Desiccation
Masson describes the standard method of killing farmed 
eels as follows: 
The primary method in industry is to bathe them in 
dry salt, which gradually penetrates and desiccates 
their bodies. It is very hard to kill an eel. So by the time 
they are ready to be “gutted,” most of them are still 
alive. Even after they are actually gutted, “a significant 
proportion is still alive after 30 minutes,” according to 
industry accounts. During that time they make strenu-
ous efforts to escape. (2009, 118)
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All of these methods of catching and killing fish cause them 
protracted, intense pain and suffering. The deaths they experi-
ence at our hands are horrific. There is no good reason to think 
that the deaths these fish would otherwise experience in the 
wild are worse than the slow, agonizing deaths they experience 
at our hands. There is no doubt that fish production and har-
vesting inflicts morally significant harm, suffering, and death 
on the fish it needlessly converts to meat.21 
V. Conclusion
Fish are conscious, sentient, intelligent creatures that can feel 
pain and can suffer. They do not experience quick and painless 
deaths at our hands. Quite the contrary, they typically experi-
ence painful, protracted, horrific deaths at our hands. Since we 
can easily meet all of our nutritional needs without consuming 
fish, there is no good reason for us to harm fish, cause them to 
suffer, or kill them for food. Consequently, the anti-HASK ar-
gument entails that eating fish is morally wrong. So, those who 
accept the anti-HASK argument for the immorality of eating 
meat are equally committed to the immorality of eating fish. 
Since ethical vegetarians do think that it is wrong to engage 
in or support HASK practices (i.e., practices that inflict harm, 
suffering, and death on conscious sentient beings for no good 
reason), they are committed to the immorality of eating fish. 
While the argument presented here has been directed pri-
marily at fish-eating ethical vegetarians, it should be clear that 
it applies with equal force to anyone who accepts (P1) – (P5). 
Those who think that it’s wrong to engage in, or pay others to 
engage in, practices that inflict harm, suffering, or death on 
conscious sentient beings for no good reason are committed to 
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the immorality of eating cows, pigs, chickens, turkeys, ducks, 
emus, sheep, and fish, and should alter their diets accordingly.22
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Endnotes
1  A sentient being is any being capable of feeling pain and/
or experiencing pleasure. 
2  We also accept the following related principles:
(P1*) It is wrong to harm sentient animals unneces-
sarily.
(P2*) It is wrong to cause sentient animals to suffer 
unnecessarily.
(P3*) It is wrong to kill sentient animals unnecessarily.
(P4*) It is wrong to engage in practices that harm or 
inflict suffering on or kill sentient animals unneces-
sarily.
(P5*) It is wrong to pay others to engage in practices 
that harm or inflict suffering on or kill sentient animals 
unnecessarily.
Strictly speaking, (P1*) – (P5*) are not equivalent to (P1) – 
(P5), respectively, because there might be a good reason to 
perform a certain action that strictly speaking isn’t necessary 
for some significant human benefit. Suppose both X and Y are 
equally effective means to achieving some important end E. 
Then, strictly speaking, performing X is not necessary to bring 
about E, since we might perform Y instead. Still, if performing 
X costs considerably less than performing Y, we might have a 
good reason to perform X to bring about E. Conversely, the 
fact performing an action A is necessary for bringing about a 
certain valuable end E doesn’t always give us a good reason 
to perform A. Suppose the only way I can save my son’s life is 
to kill you and harvest your heart and lungs, e.g., suppose you 
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are the only tissue match. In the scenario just imagined, killing 
you is necessary to save my son’s life, but that doesn’t give me 
a good reason to kill you. I still would not be justified in killing 
you. Even though necessity and having good reasons can pull 
apart in these ways, they typically go hand-in-hand. Typically, 
when performing an action is necessary for bringing about a 
significant human benefit that will give us a good reason to per-
form it; and more importantly for present purposes, typically, 
when there is no good reason to perform an action, perform-
ing that action will not be necessary for some significant hu-
man benefit. Accordingly, I will treat (P1*) – (P5*) as roughly 
equivalent to (P1) – (P5), respectively, because nothing in the 
present paper will turn on the subtle sorts of situations where 
necessity and the having of good reasons pull apart.
3  As I have already noted, these principles are central to our 
understanding of morality. Together they specify an important 
part of the underived conceptual role of the concept of moral 
wrongness. By way of illustration, consider the following much 
discussed example from Gilbert Harman: “If you round the 
corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on 
a cat and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they 
are doing is wrong; you do not need to figure anything out; you 
can see that it is wrong” (Harman 1977, 4). Harman offered the 
example to show that some moral judgments are direct, as op-
posed to inferential. What is relevant about Harman’s example 
for present purposes is this: No one seriously doubts that burn-
ing a cat to death for no good reason is wrong. Treating a cat 
in such a way causes the cat harm, suffering, and death for no 
good reason, and we all judge such conduct to be immoral. For 
a more recent non-fictional example, consider the public out-
rage that erupted when it was revealed that professional foot-
ball player Michael Vick was guilty of sponsoring dog-fighting 
rings in which pit-bulls were forced to fight to the death. As 
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with Harman’s cat, we are outraged that someone would cause 
these dogs such harm, suffering, and death for no good rea-
son, and we view those people who would engage in, or pay 
others to engage in, such conduct as morally deficient and/or 
depraved. These examples illustrate that principles (P1) – (P5) 
are partially constitutive of the very concept of moral wrong-
ness, and they confirm that no one seriously doubts (P1) – (P5).
4  To see Cohen’s commitment to (P2) here, we need only 
recognize that justification proceeds in terms of reasons. We 
are justified in causing an animal pain if and only if we have a 
good reason for doing so. If there is no good reason to cause an 
animal pain, then causing that animal pain cannot be justified.
5  Here, strictly speaking, Cohen commits himself to (P2*) 
and (P3*). See endnote 2 for details.
6  Remember the context-sensitivity qualification I stressed 
in the introduction. I am only arguing that eating meat is wrong 
when equally nutritious plant-based food is readily available 
(which, in modern societies, it almost always is). The anti-
HASK argument could be formulated cumbersomely to make 
this qualification explicit:
1.  Meat-producing animal agriculture is inherently 
a HASK practice whenever equally nutritious plant-
based food is readily available.
2.  It is wrong to engage in, or pay others to engage in, 
HASK practices (i.e., it is wrong to engage in, or pay 
others to engage in, practices that inflict harm, suffer-
ing, or death on conscious sentient beings for no good 
reason). [(P1) – (P5)]
3.  When one purchases and consumes meat when 
equally nutritious plant-based food is readily available, 
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one is paying others to engage in HASK practices on 
one’s behalf.
Therefore,
4.  It is wrong to purchase and consume meat when-
ever plant-based food is readily available (which, in 
modern societies, it almost always is).
It is this context-restricted version of the anti-HASK argument 
that I am endorsing throughout the paper. That said, I will not 
repeatedly call attention to the qualification “whenever equally 
nutritious plant-based food is available” in the body of the pa-
per. 
7  I defend the anti-HASK argument for ethical vegetarian-
ism in much more detail in Engel 2000, Engel 2001, Engel 
2012, Engel 2016b, and in this journal in Engel 2016a. For re-
lated arguments, see Jordan Curnutt (1997) and Alastair Nor-
cross (2004).
8  Debeaking is the surgical removal of the birds’ beaks. 
When beaks are cut too short or heal improperly, the birds 
cannot eat and eventually starve to death in their cages/shed 
(Davis 1996, 48, 65-71; Mason and Singer 1990, 39-40; and 
Robbins 1987, 57).
9  Singer 2009, 145.
10  The premature killing of farmed animals at a fraction of 
their natural lifespans is itself a harm. For a defense of this 
claim, see Engel 2018, 189-191.  
11  Including the Ornish study (Ornish et al. 1983, 54-59; Or-
nish et al. 1990, 129-133); the Cornell/Oxford/China study 
(Chen, Campbell et al. 1990; Campbell 1997, 24; Campbell et 
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al. 1994, 1153S-1161S); and the Loma Linda study (Phillips et 
al. 1978, S191-S198).
12  The Dietitians of Canada (the national professional orga-
nization for Registered Dietitians in Canada) concur with this 
AND position statement on vegetarian and vegan diets (Man-
gels, Messina, et al., 2003, 748). They go on to note:
Vegetarian diets offer a number of nutritional ben-
efits, including lower levels of saturated fat, choles-
terol, and animal protein as well as higher levels of 
carbohydrates, fiber, magnesium, potassium, folate, 
and antioxidants such as vitamins C and E and phy-
tochemicals. Vegetarians have been reported to have 
lower body mass indices than nonvegetarians, as well 
as lower rates of death from ischemic heart disease; 
vegetarians also show lower blood cholesterol levels; 
lower blood pressure; and lower rates of hypertension, 
type 2 diabetes, and prostate and colon cancer (Man-
gels, Messina, et al., 2003, 748).
13  The Cornell/Oxford/China Health Project is the largest 
epidemiological study ever conducted. It has systematically 
monitored the diet, lifestyle, and disease patterns of 6,500 fam-
ilies from 65 different counties in Mainland China and Taiwan. 
The information collected in this massive data set has led Dr. 
T. Colin Campbell, director of the study, and his associates to 
conclude that:
A diet comprised of a variety of good quality plant-
based foods is the healthiest. (1997, 24)
There is no threshold of plant-food richness beyond 
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Even small intakes of foods of animal origin are asso-
ciated with significant increases in plasma cholesterol 
concentrations, which are associated, in turn, with sig-
nificant increases in chronic degenerative disease mor-
tality rates. (1994, 1153S)
14  In Engel 2000 and Engel 2016a, I consider a number of 
other purported justifications for eating meat and argue that 
none of them provides a good reason for killing and eating ani-
mals when nutritionally adequate plant-based food is available. 
Given space constraints, I can’t repeat those arguments here.
15  The anti-HASK argument also shows that it is wrong to 
eat commercially produced eggs and dairy products, since 
commercial egg and dairy production are also inherently 
HASK practices. See Engel 2000, 883-886 for details. For an 
anti-HASK argument that shows that pharmacological animal 
experimentation is wrong and ought to be abolished, see Engel 
2011. 
16  It’s worth noting that only some types of fish, such as wild 
salmon, are rich in Omega-3s. Most farm-raised fish, including 
farmed salmon, are not good sources of Omega-3s, and the fish 
that most people eat increasingly comes from fish farms. 
17  In this section of the paper [§III], I report the results of 
numerous scientific experiments conducted on fishes to estab-
lish whether or not fish are sentient, intelligent beings. Let me 
be perfectly clear upfront: I do not approve of such research. 
Quite the contrary, I think the kind of invasive and ultimate-
ly lethal research that was conducted on these fish subjects is 
profoundly unethical. Indeed, in Engel 2011, I argue animal 
experimentation is morally wrong and ought to be abolished. 
Since the research conducted on these fishes was itself unjust, 
some may question whether my appealing to such research is 
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also unjust. Rebecca Tuvel (2015) has argued that it is pro tanto 
wrong to use the knowledge gained from animal experiments 
because doing so disrespects the victims and serves to further 
entrench the practice of animal experimentation. She does, 
however, acknowledge one legitimate use of such knowledge, 
namely, when the knowledge gained from the experiments is 
used to benefit either the research subjects themselves or mem-
bers of the research subjects’ species. (Tuvel 2015, 238–241) I 
am reporting the results of these experiments to show that fish 
are conscious, sentient, intelligent beings who deserve direct 
moral consideration in their own right and who thus should not 
be exploited for their flesh. My aim in sharing the knowledge 
obtained from these unethical experiments is to benefit fish by 
persuading people to leave fish off of their dinner plates for 
good. 
18  Braithwaite identifies three main reasons they chose to 
study trout: (1) Trout grow to a reasonable size, which makes 
the task of isolating receptors and nerves easier, (2) trout are a 
commercially important species, and (3) trout are closely re-
lated to salmon (globally the most popular species reared in 
aquaculture), and so, the findings for trout would likely apply 
to salmon, as well. (2010, 51) 
19  Grosenick, et al., explain how they guaranteed the out-
comes of the rigged fights as follows:
Because A. burtoni individuals vigorously defend their 
territory against intruding rivals, moving one male into 
a unit defended by another male always resulted in the 
intruder losing. Thus, we could train each bystander 
on an artificial dominance hierarchy by using animals 
whose relative status we controlled. This ensured that 
there were no consistent differences in male abilities or 
physical characteristics—a potential confounding fac-
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tor in naturally formed dominance hierarchies. (2007, 
429) . . . To control for stable physiological differences 
between fish chosen to be A–E rivals, rival positions 
were exchanged such that fish serving as the A rival 
for half of the bystanders served as the E rival for the 
other half. (2007, 431)
20  Clare Hesketh reports that an intestinal infection has 
killed 35% of juvenile yellowtail kingfish at CleanSeas Tuna’s 
Eyre Peninsula facility. (Hesketh 2012) A 2008 HSUS report 
on the welfare of animals in the aquaculture industry conclud-
ed: “Increasing mortalities are a clear indication that serious 
welfare problems exist, often from environmental effects, poor 
water quality, and infections, with some systems maintain-
ing mortality rates of nearly 30% throughout the life cycle” 
(HSUS 2008, 16). A Marine Institute report on the status of 
Irish Aquaculture tracked smolt mortality rates in Irish salmon 
farms. Mortality rates ranged from a low of 24.33% in 2002 to 
a high of 54.34% in 2005. According to S.B. Wheatley, et al., 
“Mortality rates of up to 48% have been experienced in Irish 
farmed Atlantic salmon during their first year of production at 
sea with disease outbreaks making a significant contribution to 
these mortalities” (Wheatley, et al. 1997, 195).
21  In this section [§IV], I have focused on the production, 
harvesting, and killing methods employed by commercial fish-
ers since such fishing is responsible for the vast majority of 
fish caught and killed. Space considerations preclude me from 
being able to provide an in-depth discussion of non-commer-
cial fishing, but it should be obvious that private anglers and 
recreational fishers are also engaged in HASK practices when 
they catch and kill fish. After all, they catch fish with the same 
barbed hooks used by commercial fishers. These hooks typi-
cally get imbedded in the highly sensitive nociceptor-lined 
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tissue of their throats and mouths, though sometimes fish get 
hooked on the face, in the eye, or in their gills. Once hooked, 
the fish struggles in vain to get away but eventually becomes 
exhausted and is slowly hauled in. The barbed hook is then 
removed with pliers causing even more pain and tissue dam-
age to the fish, after which the fish is left to slowly suffocate 
in an ice-filled cooler. Like commercial fishing, angling harms 
fish, causes them to suffer, and kills them for no good reason. 
Since it’s wrong to engage in HASK practices, it’s as wrong 
to catch and kill fish yourself as it is to pay others to catch and 
kill them for you. When plant-based foods are available, there 
is no justification for treating fish so badly. Thus, all forms of 
fish harvesting are HASK practices, when plant-based foods 
are available, and are wrong for that very reason.
22  I have presented earlier versions of “Fishy Reasoning” at 
the Bled Ethics Conference, Davidson College, Eastern Illinois 
University, the Midsouth Philosophy Conference, the Minding 
Animals International Conference, North Carolina State Uni-
versity, the Rochester Area Vegan Society, the Rocky Moun-
tain Ethics Congress, the Russell Philosophy Conference, the 
University of Arizona, the University of Wisconsin Colleges 
Annual Colloquium, Vanderbilt University, and Vegetarian 
Summerfest. I wish to thank those in attendance for their help-
ful comments and feedback. Special thanks to Ramona Ilea and 
the wonderful students in two of her Pacific University Animal 
Ethics classes for providing me detailed probing questions that 
helped improve the current article. I would also like to thank an 
anonymous referee for Between the Species for helpful sugges-
tions on the penultimate draft.
